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Art, Nature, and the Poesy of Plants in the Goethe-Zeit: A Biosemiotic Perspective
1
 
Kate Rigby 
 
Sometime around 1800, toward the end of his period of programmatic 
neoclassicism, Goethe took time out from his official duties at the Weimar court, and 
from his own scientific research, to compose a perfect Petrarchan sonnet addressed to the 
relationship between “art” and “nature.” While seemingly in flight from one another, we 
are told in the opening stanza, the apparent divergence of the entities thus named actually 
effects their unforeseen reunion: “Natur und Kunst, sie scheinen sich zu fliehen, / Und 
haben sich, eh man es denkt, gefunden” (Though art and nature seem sore disunited / Yet 
each, before you think, to each is turning).
2
 Reassured by this apparent reconciliation of 
nature and art, the speaker declares that his antipathy (Widerwille) (whether to the one or 
the other or, perhaps, to their apparently antipathetic trajectories) has also disappeared, 
and he now finds himself drawn equally to both. This bold beginning raises a series of 
questions, arising in no small part from the multivalence of the very terms “nature” and 
“art,” which are only partially and indirectly answered in the following stanzas. “Nature,” 
as Raymond Williams remarks in Keywords, is “perhaps the most complex word in the 
[English] language,” and judging by the lengthy entry in the Grimms’ Deutsches 
Wörterbuch, the same can certainly be said for Natur in German.
3
 One wonders, then, 
what conception and dimension of “nature” is in play here? “Art” is somewhat less 
prodigiously polysemous, but it was significantly more so in Goethe’s day. While we 
tend to associate this word primarily with the sphere of aesthetic production, as in the 
creation of works of art, around 1800, Kunst, like “art” in English, could also refer to 
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activities that would today be classified in terms of “craft.” Such crafty “arts” could also 
include the experimental techniques deployed by those who had adopted Sir Francis 
Bacon’s novum organon in order to induce “nature” to surrender “her” closely guarded 
secrets.
4
 What kind of “art” is this, then, that is seemingly so at odds with “nature”? Why 
are they in flight from one another? And on what basis, and in what manner, might their 
apparent reunification be effected?In this essay, I propose to explore these questions from 
an ecocritical and ecophilosophical perspective. In particular, I wish to reconsider 
German Romantic-era understandings of the interrelationship of art and nature with 
respect to the burgeoning new field of multi- and interdisciplinary study that became 
known in the 1980s as “biosemiotics.” Biosemiotics entails the examination of those 
multifarious and multifaceted communicative processes (semiosis) that are intrinsic to the 
existence and interactions of all living organisms (bios). Discussions of the historical 
antecedents of biosemiotics not infrequently allude to the legacy of German Romantic 
biology and Naturphilosophie. Prisca Augustyn, for instance, refers to the “Romantic 
Biology or natural organicism of Kant, Goethe, and Schelling that sees nature as creative 
force and creation at once, where perfect form is found in plants and animals as in poetry 
or art,” as the “bedrock of biosemiotic thought.”5 Similarly, Donald Favareau, in his 
detailed “Evolutionary History of Biosemiotics” acknowledges the importance of 
German Romantic thought in the intellectual milieu of one of the major forefathers of 
biosemiotics, the German-Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), and its 
legacy in his language.
6
 Such legacies nonetheless remain underresearched and even 
appear at times to be a source of concern to contemporary biosemioticians. For example, 
Tommi Vehkavaraa is at pains to distinguish the account of the continuity between 
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biological life and human mental activity developed by another biosemiotic forefather, 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), from that of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie,7 while 
Romantic science does not even rate a mention in Favareau’s “Brief History of the Sign 
Concept in Pre-modernist Science,” which appeared in the inaugural issue of the journal 
Biosemiotics in 2008.
8
 In his “Evolutionary History,” moreover, Favareau admits that he 
doctored a quotation from Uexküll, in which the latter criticizes Darwin’s reductive 
account of causality in his evolutionary theory, by replacing the Estonian biologist’s 
“teleologically ‘loaded’” reference to the organism’s internal “strive [sic] for perfection” 
with the phrase “component in the active self-organization and creation” of the individual 
organism.
9
 While the contemporary biosemiotician’s caution with regard to such 
teleological assumptions might be well warranted, I suspect that the widespread 
downplaying and relative neglect of Peirce’s and Uexküll’s Romantic antecedents might 
be motivated, at least in part, by prejudicial assumptions, which remain widely held in the 
English-speaking world in particular but which have been fundamentally challenged by 
recent revaluations of the thought, literature, and science of the German region around 
1800.
10
 The primary objective of this essay, then, is to contribute to the as-yet-small body 
of work that is beginning to explore the Romantic antecedents and affiliations of 
biosemiotics, in light of some of these important reassessments.
11
 Following a brief 
outline of the biosemiotic project, I will focus on the reconceptualization of the 
interrelationship between “art” and “nature” that Goethe and some of his 
contemporaries—in particular, Schelling and, to a lesser extent, the other young 
Romantics in Jena—were undertaking around 1800. Moving from the terrain of the 
history of ideas into a more literary-critical mode, I will conclude with a reading of 
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Goethe’s 1798 poem “Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen” (The Metamorphosis of Plants), 
in which I indicate how a reconsideration of such Romantic-era engagements with the 
interrelationship between natural becoming and poetic communication might contribute 
to the aesthetic and ethical elaboration of biosemiotic insights in the present. 
 
Biosemiotics in Brief 
Biosemiotics proceeds from the premise that “living nature,” as Jesper Hoffmeyer 
puts it, is “essentially driven by, or actually consist[s] of, semiosis.”12 Among the diverse 
vehicles of communication that are perpetually composing, recomposing, decomposing, 
and interconnecting the multifarious life-forms that constitute Earth’s biosphere are 
sound, scent, movement, pressure, texture, taste, and shape, as well as more elusive but 
nonetheless powerfully efficacious phenomena such as electrical fields and chemical 
effusions. From a biosemiotic perspective, the whole world—or, rather, all worlds, since, 
as Uexküll discovered, each organism has its own—is, as Peirce put it, “perfused with 
signs”:13 from the level of the individual cell, which is obliged to interpret the genome 
that it contains in order to help build a body within a particular biophysical environment, 
to that of the literary critic who, perchance, interprets a poem to help build understanding 
within a particular sociocultural environment. Biosemiotics is a fast-growing field with 
diverse disciplinary manifestations, ramifications, and cross-fertilizations. Claus 
Emmeche’s succinct definition from 1992 nonetheless still holds good: 
 
Biosemiotics proper deals with sign processes in nature in all dimensions, 
including 1) the emergence of semiosis in nature, which may coincide with or 
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anticipate the emergence of living cells; 2) the natural history of signs; 3) the 
“horizontal” aspect of semiosis in the ontogeny of organisms, in plant and animal 
communication, and in inner sign functions in the immune and nervous systems; 
and 4) the semiotics of cognition and language.
14
 
 
Biosemiotics proper, as Hoffmeyer observes, was invented independently several times 
over the latter part of the twentieth century. It is widely accepted, however, that the 
preeminent figure who “had the broadminded intellect and indefatigable energy to 
assemble all the threads that would serve as the foundation for the modern biosemiotic 
project” (Hoffmeyer 364) was the Hungarian-born American linguist Thomas Sebeok 
(1920–2001), to whom Hoffmeyer’s authoritative introduction to the field is dedicated. 
The two main threads out of which Sebeok wove his synthesis were the “semeiotic” 
philosophy of American Pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce and the “Umwelt” theory of 
German-Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll, which he explored in depth with Jakob’s 
grandson, the medical researcher Thure von Uexküll.  
Sebeok was fascinated by nonhuman-animal and human-animal communication, 
and in Peirce he found a theory of sign relations that was not restricted to human verbal 
communication—unlike the semiology of Ferdinand Saussure that was taken up so 
enthusiastically in French structuralism and poststructuralism, contributing to the 
pronounced anthropocentrism of the kind of Theory that was so eagerly assimilated into 
literary and cultural studies from the 1970s onward. In order to advance the theory of 
“zoosemiotics” that he had already begun to postulate in the early 1960s, Sebeok needed 
to be able to account for the process whereby animals come to translate corporeal 
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sensations into meaningful perceptions. It was in the revised second edition (1928) of 
Jakob von Uexküll’s Theoretische Biologie, which he read in the original German in 
1978, that he found the key: namely, in Uexküll’s redeployment of the existing German 
term Umwelt (environment) to designate a species-specific and more-or-less individually 
nuanced phenomenal world, a world, that is, composed of signs. As Hoffmeyer observes, 
Uexküll “was working very much within a nineteenth century Romantic intellectual 
culture that was still vibrant in Estonia, while the science of Darwin’s England was 
increasingly utilitarian, mechanistic and Malthusian” (32). Among his most important 
influences, moreover, were Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and the developmental or 
“epigenetic” biology of Goethe and Karl Ernst von Baer, among others.17 Uexküll’s 
research into the perceptual worlds of other-than-human animals revealed how every 
organism’s Umwelt is borne out of the functionality of its particular bodily constitution 
and conditioned by its developmental stage and life experience. This is correlated with a 
mental model of reality, or Innenwelt, that determines whether and how any entity that 
enters an animal’s physical environment might become a bearer of meaning—one that the 
animal will be called upon to interpret wisely in order to interact with it appropriately 
(e.g., as predator, prey, playfellow, mate, or the source of some other kind of potential 
trouble, pleasure, or interest). The relationship between an organism and its environment 
is dynamic, being continuously renegotiated through what Uexküll termed the 
“Funktionskreis” (functional cycle) of perception and action that “effectively ‘couples’ 
the ever-changing system that is the organism to the ever-changing system that is the 
world” (Favareau, “Evolutionary History,” 32). While Sebeok and others have since 
extended this zoosemiotic line of inquiry, other biosemioticians have gone on to explore 
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the sign relations that obtain within organisms (“endosemiosis”), among plants 
(“phytosemiosis”), and even in inanimate nature (“physiosemiosis”). Of particular 
relevance to this essay is also the nascent field of “ecosemiotics,” which encompasses 
research into human communication with, and about, nature, as mediated through the 
sign systems of human culture, and which might be considered part of the wider field of 
environmental (or “ecocritical”) literary and cultural studies.19 
Most biosemiotic research hitherto has been conducted by natural scientists. 
However, it has also begun to attract the attention of a growing number of researchers in 
the environmental humanities. It is not hard to see why: by repositioning articulate human 
language on a continuum with the varied semiotic transactions with which all other 
organisms are also involved, biosemiotics opens a pathway out of the dead end of human 
exceptionalism, which is viewed by many ecophilosophers and ecopolitical theorists as 
contributing to what might well turn out to be a terminal ecological crisis.
20
 In addition to 
restoring communicative agency to nonhumans, moreover, biosemiotics expands our 
understanding of human sign relations. As “whole creatures,” as Wendy Wheeler has it, 
humans, in common with other animals, also participate in a host of corporeal 
communications that generally transpire below the level of consciousness.
21
 It is for this 
reason, as Peirce stressed, that we always know more than we think we know. Caught up, 
as we tend to be, in the world composed by the words that are forever running through 
our heads, passing out of our mouths, into our ears, or being traced by our eyes or 
fingertips, much of what we know viscerally, so to speak, does not make it into our field 
of awareness. Occasionally, though, some of the signs that our mindful bodies are 
perpetually decoding might be felt in the flesh, such as the approach of a threat whose 
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source we have not yet identified, or might be intuited as a hunch, which could give rise 
to one of those creative insights that Peirce termed “abductions.” 
This is not to say that we would be better off without that world of words, though. 
On the contrary: biosemioticians view articulate human language as the most complex 
mode of communication that has evolved thus far on Earth. With growing complexity 
comes what Hoffmeyer terms increasing “semiotic freedom,”22 entailing heightened self-
awareness, including the ability to recognize, as Kant influentially enjoined us to do, that 
the world disclosed to us through our ideas, words, and the embodied experiences that 
they coconstruct does not necessarily correspond to the way things are “in themselves.” 
The geohistorically unprecedented degree of semiotic freedom that humans have acquired 
along their evolutionary journey has enabled the intergenerational creation, perpetuation, 
and transformation of symbol-based communal cultures, which, under certain 
geohistorical conditions, have in turn facilitated the emergence of greater social 
complexity and the augmentation and acceleration of communication across time and 
space through the development of new media (from writing to the Internet), thus enabling 
the creation of new kinds of knowledge, along with enhanced technological capacities. 
This growth in semiotic freedom is nonetheless a risky business. For one thing, it 
goes hand in hand with an ever-expanding margin of potential misunderstanding: while 
some organisms deploy signs to deceive others (e.g., by puffing up their fur or feathers to 
appear larger than they actually are), my dogs are rather less likely to misread the 
chemical signal left by a fellow canine, let alone the sight of its raised hackles, than I am 
the nuances of any conversation I might have with a neighbor while my dogs and I are 
out for a walk. In everyday life, the muddles that can arise from the slipperiness of verbal 
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communication, especially in written form and hence in the absence of invaluable 
nonverbal signals, can be a real drag. In verbal works of art, however, this very 
multivalence, or semiotic openness, is the essence of the aesthetic experience. More 
troublesome, potentially, is a further concomitant of the increased semiotic freedom 
facilitated by articulate language: namely, the development of a certain alienation from 
our own corporeal being and sensory perceptions and, potentially, from other beings 
(especially other-than-human ones) and from the natural world more generally. Once 
inducted into the world of words, and hence into a particular cultural formation, our own 
naturality can no longer be taken for granted, becoming instead something with which we 
are obliged to entertain a relationship, rather than something that prescribes what we are 
and might become. This implies also that as linguistically enculturated creatures, the 
recognition of our corporeal, or psychophysical, interconnectedness with other creatures 
and our earthly environs does not simply come naturally: paradoxically, the recognition 
of our own naturality, along with our connectivities with nonhuman others, is necessarily 
a cultural achievement.
23
 Societies vary significantly in this respect, and one of the 
distinguishing features of Euro-Western culture, as noted previously, has been the 
predominance of dualistic discourses of human exceptionalism, often grounded in claims 
about language and reason as opposed to, and elevated above, the merely material realm 
of nature. Such discourses have tended to hinder the recognition of the naturality of 
human beings, with increasingly catastrophic socioecological and ecoethical 
consequences.
24
 Here too, though, it is the heightened self-reflexivity afforded by greater 
semiotic freedom that facilitates this kind of cultural critique, along with the attendant 
possibility of consciously cultivating more ecological and ethical modes of engagement 
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both with our own creatureliness and with other creatures and our earthly environs. It is 
just such a deployment of the multivalent language of written poetry to reconnect human 
mental and moral life with the biosemiotic becoming of other living entities that I trace 
below in Goethe’s “Metamorphose der Pflanzen.” 
As I see it, then, the biosemiotic pathway out of human exceptionalism is 
particularly appealing because it does not propel us into the counterposed cul-de-sac of 
denying human peculiarities, including the stupendous peculiarity of articulate speech 
and all that this enables. In the face of deepening socioecological damage and disorder, 
we will need to bring into play our human peculiarities no less than our creaturely 
connectivities in redressing these problems, as graciously, courageously, and creatively 
as we can. It is widely accepted that this current crisis was set in train as an unintended 
consequence of those technoscientific advances, facilitated by our semiotic freedom in 
conjunction, of course, with our niftily opposable thumbs, that go by the name of the 
Industrial Revolution. The beginnings of the calamitous Anthropocene, when humans 
began to emerge as a geological force on a whole new scale through their use of fossil-
fuel combustion, can be dated to the late eighteenth century.
25
 But so too can that ferment 
of conversation, reflection, and writing on human language and creativity and its 
relationship to the “poesy” and “productivity” of more-than-human nature that, as I hope 
to indicate here, not only forms a key moment in the prehistory of biosemiotics but also 
has much to contribute to contemporary ecosemiotic research and reflection. 
 
Art and Nature in Weimar and Jena c. 1800: Toward Biosemiotics 
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Let me begin this consideration of the Romantic antecedents of biosemiotics by 
returning to the sonnet with which I began. The semantic amplitude carried by the key 
terms of “art” and “nature” that I noted with respect to the opening stanza is partially 
pared back as the speaker proceeds to exemplify their reconciliation in the second: 
 
 Es gilt wohl nur ein redliches Bemühen! 
 Und wenn wir erst in abgemeßnen Stunden 
 Mit Geist und Fleiß uns an die Kunst gebunden, 
 Mag frei Natur im Herzen wieder glühen. (MA 6.1:780)  
[An honest effort’s bound to be required! 
If measured hours we dedicate to learning 
And bind ourselves to art with zeal discerning 
The heart may glow with nature new ignited.] 
 
Here, Kunst is configured as an activity that demands regular periods of dedicated labor, 
conjoining mental or spiritual gifts (Geist) with diligent application (Fleiß), such as that 
which might be required, for instance, in the verbal crafting of a Petrarchan sonnet, as 
well as in innumerable other forms of disciplined creative endeavor (including, 
potentially, scientific ones). As that which “frei im Herzen glüht” (freely glows in the 
heart) following these hours of painstaking effort, the initially wide-open semantic field 
of Natur has been contracted down to that of “inner nature,” evidently denoting the 
subject’s “natural” tendencies, drives, or inclinations. This qualification nonetheless 
opens further questions regarding the precise relationship between the “redliches 
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Bemühen” (“honest effort” or “toil”) demanded by artistic endeavor and that which sets 
the subject’s heart alight. Is this simply a matter of accepting the bourgeois dictum of 
work before pleasure? I think not. The rhymed pair that frames this stanza (Bemühen-
Glühen) suggests a more intrinsic relation, implying that the natural inclination that is 
assumed here is one that seeks satisfaction through the very process of poiesis: that it is 
of the nature of the subject (whether understood narrowly qua artist/craftsman or, more 
inclusively, qua human being) to desire, and to be enlivened by, the work of making 
things, of poietic practice, verbal or otherwise. 
Following the semantic contraction of the second part of the octave, the “volta” 
brings a renewed expansion, and further complexities. The opening line of the third 
stanza offers a generalization that is often seen as pertaining to the sphere of specifically 
human activity considered thus far under the rubric of Kunst: “So ist’s mit aller Bildung 
auch beschaffen” (So too all forming culture needs some tether). This association is 
implicit, not only in Whaley’s translation, given in parentheses above, but also, for 
example, in David Luke’s, which reads: “All culture is like this.”26 All translations 
presuppose interpretation, of course, but in these instances, the interpretive choice 
drastically narrows the denotation of the German word, Bildung, which in turn limits the 
connotations of the poem as a whole. For in Goethe’s lexicon, Bildung is by no means 
restricted to human culture but can be observed also in the formation of all those natural 
phenomena—from solar systems to the tiniest of Earth’s living organisms, to the amorous 
gaze that the poet imagines being shared between the earliest of our human ancestors—
that he celebrated in another poem of this period, “Die Weltseele” (The World Soul). As 
he observed in one of his “Maxims and Reflections,” with reference to the metamorphic 
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process of crystallization in the mineral realm, “Die schönste Metamporphose des 
unorganischen Reiches ist, wenn beim Entstehen das Amorphe sich ins Gestaltete 
verwandelt. Jede Masse hat hiezu Trieb und Recht” (MA 17:928; Every material has the 
right and inclination” to take “a structure as it comes into being).27 In nature, then, no less 
than in art, the emergence of distinct entities with a determinate form involves the 
delimitation of the boundless: the refusal of all limits thus impedes the realization of that 
“Vollendung” (“perfection” or “completion”) toward which the poet presumes both 
human making and natural becoming aspire. 
In order to contextualize this leap from the apparent polarity of art and nature to 
their common ground in those more-than-human formative processes signified by aller 
Bildung, it is pertinent to recall that “Die Weltseele” was written in response to 
Schelling’s 1798 philosophical work of that name, Von der Weltseele—Eine Hypothese 
der höheren Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus, of which Goethe had 
received an advance copy. It was evidently his enthusiasm for this work, in conjunction 
with his personal liking for the charming young philosopher, that motivated Goethe to 
accede to Niethammer’s and Schiller’s request that he support Schelling’s appointment to 
a professorship at the University of Jena (Richards 148). Goethe was no doubt gratified to 
note that Schelling used Goethe’s own studies of morphology and optics in this work. 
One can also assume that Goethe approved strongly of Schelling’s move away from the 
Fichteanism of his earlier Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (Ideas toward a 
Philosophy of Nature, 1797), which is primarily concerned with nature as conceived by 
the human mind, and toward a consideration of those observed processes of natural 
becoming of which the human mind could now be understood as itself a product: a move 
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that is made more decisively in his Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Philosophie der 
Natur (First Projection of a System of the Philosophy of Nature) and the subsequently 
published (1799) Einleitung (introduction) thereto, which were profoundly indebted to 
Schelling’s conversations with Goethe, following Schelling’s move to Jena in mid-1798 
(Nassar, Romantic Absolute, 193–95).Schelling’s mature philosophy of nature broke not 
only with Fichtean transcendental reasoning but also with the reductive view of matter 
associated with Newtonian atomism and Cartesian dualism and mechanism. In countering 
the construction of matter as inert and devoid of any kind of interiority, Schelling is 
widely seen as drawing on, as well as significantly modifying, Leibnizian vitalism, 
Spinozan monism, and Neoplatonic emanationism. But as becomes evident from the 
wealth of recent research cited in Von der Weltseele, advances in the empirical study of 
physical phenomena also pointed to the apparent insufficiency of a purely mechanistic 
and atomistic view of matter: Newton himself had admitted that he could not fully 
account for the phenomenon of gravity in those terms, and as Kant had already posited in 
his essay “Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft” (Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science, 1786), current findings in the sexy new fields of 
galvanism, magnetism, and chemistry were suggestive of a self-organizing tendency 
within matter itself, which appeared to arise from the dynamic interplay of counterposing 
forces.
30
 It was, however, above all, contemporary research into the even more 
remarkable phenomenon of life—which appeared so resistant to mechanistic 
determinations that Kant had declared it off-limits to scientific investigation
31—that 
inspired Schelling’s modern reconceptualization of Spinoza’s natura naturans (nature 
naturing) as an immanent principle of purposive self-organization and dynamic self-
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transformation within the temporal becoming of the natural world as a whole, which 
could now be reconceived as a meta-organism (allgemeiner Organismus), of which 
human consciousness too was integrally a part. According to the wholly immanental 
theory of dynamic evolution advanced in Von der Weltseele, then, life is not infused into 
matter from outside, but rather matter itself had acquired life with the emergence of 
organic forms: “Das Prinzip des Lebens . . . hat sich die organische Materie angebildet” 
(Organic matter has formed within itself the principle of life; emphasis in original), 
implying that the potential for the emergence of living organisms is inherent in nature.
32
 
Similarly, human consciousness was not infused into organic matter from outside, but 
could now be understood as having emerged through an evolutionary process, which, in 
the Erster Entwurf and the Einleitung, Schelling attributed to the dynamic interplay of 
generative and inhibiting forces within the infinite “productivity” of natural becoming.33 
There was, therefore, a real (as opposed to an ideal or transcendental) continuity between 
inorganic and organic matter and between organic life and human consciousness: all 
things, moreover, remained interconnected within that “gemeinschaftliches Medium” (W 
257; common medium) that Schelling had previously troped under the ancient name 
(with more recent Neoplatonic resonances) of the “world-soul” but that could now be 
understood as inherent to matter itself in its creatively self-organizing and dynamically 
self-transforming dimension of natura naturans.
35Read intertextually with Schelling’s 
mature Naturphilosophie, then, it becomes possible to understand the reunification or 
reconciliation of art and nature that is at once proclaimed and instantiated by Goethe’s 
sonnet as a matter not only of analogous formative processes—the acceptance of 
limitation—but also of evolutionary emergence. It is precisely in these terms—
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encouraged, no doubt, by Schelling’s contributions to the soirees then being hosted by 
Caroline Schlegel—that Friedrich Schlegel writes of human artistic, and especially 
literary, creativity in his Gespräch über die Poesie (Conversation on Poesy), published in 
1800: namely, that it is dependent upon, and indeed grows out of, the prior “formlose und 
bewußtlose Poesie” (unformed and unconscious poesy) of the living earth, of which we 
are ourselves a “Blüte” (bloom, my trans.). This primal poesy, “die sich in der Pflanze 
regt, im Lichte strahlt, im Kinde lächelt, in der Blüte der Jugend schimmert, in der 
liebenden Brust der Frauen glüht” (which stirs in the plant and shines in the light, smiles 
in a child, gleams in the flower of youth, and glows in the loving bosom of women), 
Schlegel avers, has always been humanity’s privileged “Gegenstand und . . . Stoff aller 
Tätigkeit und Freude” (object and source of activity and joy). The human capacity to 
“Die Musik des unendlichen Spielwerks zu vernehmen, die Schönheit des Gedichts zu 
verstehen, sind wir fähig, weil auch ein Teil des Dichters, eine Funke seines schaffenden 
Geistes in uns lebt und tief unter der Asche der selbstgemachten Unvernunft mit 
heimlicher Gewalt zu glühen niemals aufhört” (hear the music of the unceasing action” 
(my trans.) of natural becoming, and “to understand the beauty of [this] poem” arises 
because we are ourselves “a part of the poet, a part of his creative spirit lives in us and 
never ceases to glow with secret force under the ashes of our self-induced unreason”).36 
For the young Schlegel, at the height of his Romantic avant-gardism, this poetic deity 
(Gottheit), like Schelling’s “world soul,” was located within nature, which Schlegel too 
had come to understand as a creatively self-organizing and dynamically self-transforming 
meta-organism.
37Schelling, for his part, was inspired by his conversations with Schlegel’s 
group, as well as with Schiller and Goethe, to broach the question of the relationship 
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between artistic creation and natural becoming along new lines in his System des 
transzendentalen Idealismus (System of Transcendental Idealism), also published in 1800. 
Here, the opposition between the “unconscious” poesy of (nonhuman) nature and the 
intentionality of human artistic formation implicit in the opening effusion of Schlegel’s 
Gespräch finds a remarkable resolution: namely, in the idea that the work of art is, in fact, 
not a purely intentional creation but rather emerges from the interplay of “unconscious” 
urgings and conscious crafting. In Richard’s gloss, Schelling’s argument runs like this: 
  
Insistent forces thus well up from the unconscious nature of the artist and rush in 
turbulent cascades through the narrows of consciousness. This creates . . . violent 
eddies of contradiction that “set in motion the artistic urge.” Such contradictions 
can only be calmed in the execution of the work of art. As the artist comes to rest 
in the finished, objective product, he or she will sense the union of nature and self, 
or necessity and freedom, of—finally—the unconscious and the conscious self. 
(162) 
 
This in turn opens a further perspective on Goethe’s sonnet. Whether or not he 
penned this poem after he had read his advance copy of the System, of which he 
commented in a letter to its author in September 1800 that he was “decisively inclined 
towards your doctrine,”39 it is noteworthy that the reunification of art and nature 
announced in the opening stanza is said to have occurred prior to reflection: “eh man es 
denkt.” Read intertextually with the System, this could be seen to suggest that the inner 
glow that the subject is said to experience following her or his artistic exertions in the 
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second stanza arises not only from the outlet provided to the generalized urge to create 
that is evidently part of our evolutionary inheritance as homo faber but also because the 
product of this conscientious labor provides an at-least-partial materialization of those 
specific unconscious feelings that fed into its creation. As we have seen, in Goethe’s 
version of dynamic evolution, the emergence of organized forms in nature, as in art, is 
dependent upon limitation: specifically, the interplay of expansion and constraint that 
propels the process of differentiation and augmentation (Steigerung), which is here 
referred to as the quest for perfection, and that is denied to those who instead aspire to 
boundlessness. The explicit conclusion, then, reads: “In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst 
der Meister / Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben” (Constraint is where you show 
you are a master / And only law is freedom’s sure foundation). Since, however, Goethe, 
not unlike the Schelling of the Erster Entwurf, accepts that the “pure heights of 
perfection” represent a goal toward which we can but strive (streben), without necessarily 
ever reaching this exalted destination, new living organisms and forms of life are forever 
coming into being, and no one poem can ever give the final word: art and nature are 
therefore linked also in their inevitable failure to render the unconscious fully conscious 
or to fully materialize the absolute. But it is this very inadequacy that makes them an 
ongoing concern: just as, from the rather-dire perspective of the Erster Entwurf,
40
 the 
engendering of the absolutely perfect organism would bring evolution to a standstill, so 
too, the crafting of the absolutely perfect poem would imply the end of art. 
While the reconceptualization of human consciousness and, hence, of the “poesy 
of words” as an outgrowth of the autopoiesis of the living Earth, implies a broadly 
evolutionary perspective, Schelling moves toward a specifically biosemiotic insight in his 
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identification of the role of the unconscious in the creative process, as well as in his 
discussion of “ästhetische Anschauung” (aesthetic intuition) and its place in both 
philosophical illumination and scientific discovery, to the extent, namely, that these 
processes involve what Peirce termed “abduction.” Such intuitions are in play, Schelling 
suggests, when an idea impresses itself upon the mind before one has grasped what it 
means or how it has been arrived at, or when a sense of the whole has been glimpsed 
prior to the analysis of the parts that constitute the phenomenon in question.
41
 It is the 
“Dichtungsvermögen” (poetic capacity) that enables these kinds of intuitions to find their 
initial articulation in figurative language: metaphor, in this sense, constitutes a bridge 
whereby that which is as yet unknown enters into the sphere of the known. As Wheeler 
has observed, Schelling’s theory of the creative agency of metaphor (and, I would add, 
aesthetic intuition more generally) can be seen as a significant precursor to the Peircean 
notion of abduction: that is, the process whereby signs that have been registered and 
associations that have been made below the level of consciousness by the Umwelt-aware 
embodied mind give rise to insightful new “hunches.”42But what of the biosemiotic 
consideration of communication within and among other-than-human organisms? The 
idea that language extends beyond the human plays an important role in German 
Romantic thought and literature in the guise of the topos of “natural language” or the 
“language of nature” (Natursprache): a concept that enters Romanticism via Franz 
Baader’s, J. G. Hamann’s, and J. G. Herder’s reception of Paracelsus and Jakob Böhme, 
with links to earlier, especially Neoplatonic, notions of the “Book of Nature.”43 This 
lineage is apparent, for example, in Novalis’s notes for his counter-encyclopèdie, Das 
allgemeine Brouillon (1798/99), when he asserts, “Der Mensch spricht nicht allein—auch 
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das Universum spricht—alles spricht—unendliche Sprachen. Lehre von den Signaturen” 
(need translation), in a clear allusion to Paracelsus’s “doctrine of signatures.”44 As Axel 
Goodbody observes in what remains, to my knowledge, the only book-length study of 
this key Romantic topos, the question of Natursprache figures significantly in three main 
fields of inquiry (which not infrequently overlap in particular instances): theologically, it 
concerns the relationship between God and creation; philosophically, it concerns the 
relationship between mind and matter; and poetologically, it concerns the relationship 
between poetic language and natural symbols (Goodbody, Natursprache, 13). 
Goodbody’s primary interest in this pre-ecocritical study46 is with the aesthetic 
implications of the discourse of Natursprache, especially as it figures in the work of 
Novalis and Eichendorff and returns in modernist guise in the poetics of Wilhelm 
Lehmann and Günther Eich. During the Romantic period, the primary poetological 
deployment of the Natursprache topos construes the natural world as a hieroglyphic 
script, comprising a network of symbolic associations, which can be disclosed only in the 
noninstrumentalizing language of poetry, which is itself understood as aspiring to reunite 
signifier and signified through its use of natural symbols. It is in this sense that Schelling 
too observes in the System that “Was wir Natur nennen, ist ein Gedicht, das in geheimer 
wunderbarer Schrift verschlossen liegt” (628; what we call nature is a poem that is 
enclosed in a secret, wondrous script). The symbolic meanings that emerge from the 
aesthetic contemplation of nature are no longer held to be fixed (as in earlier versions of 
the Book of Nature), implying that their interpretation is potentially endless. Even so, 
these meanings were not taken to be entirely arbitrary, to the extent that they were held to 
arise from the hidden interconnectivities that, pace Schelling, obtained among natural 
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phenomena as well as between humans and nature at a corporeal and largely unconscious 
level. 
As Jörg Zimmermann (244) has observed, the Romantics held that the “voice” of 
nature became audible only when natural phenomena were viewed as subjects in their 
own right; and it became comprehensible only to those human subjects who recognized 
themselves as part of nature. In this respect, the Natursprache topos was clearly pitched 
against mechanistic, dualistic, and instrumentalist approaches to the natural world. What 
remains occluded here, though, is the possibility that other-than-human entities are 
engaged in their own communicative exchanges, regardless of what we make of them. In 
order to pursue this question it is necessary to consider that aspect of the Natursprache 
topos that Goodbody leaves aside: namely, its links to Romantic natural philosophy and 
natural history. This is a big project, and one that I can make only a modest start on here; 
I will do so by returning to Schelling’s Weltseele. The exemplar that Schelling provides 
as evidence for the “common medium” interconnecting all natural phenomena at the end 
of the Weltseele is the observed behavior of those animals who become visibly distressed 
immediately prior to the occurrence of large earthquakes: it is, he writes, “as if the same 
cause, which shatters mountains and raises islands out of the sea, also moves the 
breathing breast of animals” (W 257). There is now considerable empirical support for 
this phenomenon, which provides an intriguing instance of those zoosemiotic processes 
that are just beginning to be rigorously investigated. With respect to the living world, 
moreover, it is tempting to argue that Schelling’s “common medium” is nothing more, 
nor less, mysterious than the communicative matrix of biospherical semiosis. This is not 
a possibility that he pursues here though, preferring to look for an immanental, if 
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“ethereal,”50 universal connection instead of considering the existence of particular 
communicative media, such as those that evidently enable certain other species to pick up 
atmospheric, haptic, or auditory signs of an imminent earth movement that human senses 
are too dull, or too dulled, to discern and decode. In his earlier discussion of animal 
Erregbarkeit and Sensibilität (“irritability” and “sensibility”), Schelling does nonetheless 
move in a distinctly biosemiotic direction, namely, in his prefiguration of Uexküll’s 
examination of the way in which each organism perceives its species-specific Umwelt.In 
the biology of his day, these were two of the three primary modes of “excitability” that 
were seen to be characteristic of all life, the third being “reproduction” (including growth, 
maintenance, self-repair, and drives, in addition to the generation of individuals of like 
kind). “Irritability” referred to physiological responses to external stimuli, such as the 
contraction of muscles, changes in the movement and constituents of bodily fluids, and 
alterations to the action of inner organs (i.e., similar to what would now be referred to as 
autonomic nervous system reactions). “Sensibility” was connected with “irritability” but 
referred to the ability to make and retain impressions of external stimuli—to interpret 
them, as it were, if not necessarily consciously. The kinds of sensible impressions thus 
formed, moreover, were in turn related to an organism’s particular corporeal organization, 
its physical form, and, hence, its psychophysical capacities, impulses, and orientations. 
What Schelling refers to here as an animal’s “Sphäre eigenthümlicher Eindrücke” (W 
248; sphere of characteristic impressions), I would suggest, constitutes an important 
precursor to Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of the animal’s “inner world,” the semiotic 
bubble through which it construes and negotiates its Umwelt. The signs that an animal 
registers as significant through, for instance, its faculties of sight and hearing, Schelling 
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goes on to argue, are conditioned by its innate inclinations—its Instinkt (W 249; instinct). 
Somewhat surprisingly, he observes that humans too see and hear only that “wozu er zu 
erkennen Trieb hat” (W 250; which they are inclined, or impelled, to recognize, emphasis 
in original). This, however, he designates as a “higher instinct,” which, when directed 
toward that which is great and beautiful, is called “genius” (W 250).It is important to 
stress that Schelling’s commitment to reconnecting human consciousness and creativity 
with the more-than-human realm from which we had been summarily severed within 
Cartesian dualism, and from which we remained estranged within Kantian criticism, and 
which, worse still, was effectively obliterated as an independent entity within Fichtean 
Idealism, did not imply the negation of human freedom. This is now reconceived, 
however, as a potential that has arisen out of a temporal process of development that had 
given rise to increasing levels of organization in the living world: what biologist and 
protoevolutionary thinker Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer, one of Schelling’s major sources 
(and, subsequently, his son’s professor), termed the organizational sequence, or 
Organisationsreihe (Richards 247). In this way, as Frederick Beiser has observed, 
Schelling’s natura naturans, unlike Spinoza’s, which was static and eternal and 
manifested equally in all natural entities, is seen to have produced something that is 
reminiscent of the old medieval hierarchical “Great Chain of Being,” with humans at the 
top.
52
 With the emergence of human consciousness, then, Nature acquires the capacity to 
reflect upon itself. There is, no doubt, a moment of humanist hubris here, but it is 
qualified by the recognition not only of human dependence upon the prior and ongoing 
processes of natural becoming but also of the untranscendable limits of human 
knowledge. If we are ourselves a part of nature, we can never step outside it to know it as 
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a whole; and since, according to Schelling’s holistic thinking, the individual parts acquire 
their full meaning and significance only in relation to this elusive whole, any 
understanding that we form of them will necessarily be partial. Not only does this imply 
that nature can never be fully transparent to human reason, but Schelling also came to 
accept (in company with the young Romantics in Jena, and contra Fichte) that reason 
could not be self-grounding.
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 There is nonetheless no doubt that Schelling accorded 
humans an exalted place in the scheme of things: for with the emergence of human 
language and consciousness, the creative freedom that Schelling attributes to natura 
naturans is raised to what he came to term a new “potency,” with the process of artistic 
creation as the privileged locus for the reunification, on a higher level, of mind and 
matter that had always been implicit in natural becoming. As Schelling avers in the 
System, “jede Pflanze ist ein Symbol der Intelligenz” (490; every plant is a symbol of 
intelligence). But in the verbal symbols of a poetic work of art, the inherent intelligence 
of a plant might be disclosed in a whole new light, as I indicate below with regard to 
Goethe’s “Metamorphose der Pflanzen.” 
 
Ecosemiosis in the “Metamorphosis of Plants”: Toward an Ethics of Communicative Co-
becoming 
If, as Richards observes, the conclusion of Schelling’s System—not unlike the 
figure of Ludovico in Schlegel’s Gespräch—prefigures a “new poetics of nature that 
would explicitly unite the scientific and the aesthetic” (164), then Goethe’s poetic 
reformulation of the scientific observations on the “metamorphosis of plants” (1790) that 
he had undertaken in 1798 could be seen to answer the philosopher’s call before it had 
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been penned. Inspired in part by the negative example of Erasmus Darwin’s aesthetically 
infelicitous Botanic Garden (1789), this poem, together with “Die Metamorphose der 
Tiere” (The Metamorphosis of Animals, 1799/1800), was conceived as part of a longer 
work that Goethe was considering writing at this time, a work along the lines of 
Lucretius’s De rerum natura, which his friend Knebel was translating.56Although 
composed in classical elegiac couplets and subsequently placed among his “elegies,” 
“Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen” reads more like an idyll and is, in Nicholas Boyle’s 
view, “one of Goethe’s happiest poems” (676). It does nonetheless incorporate an elegiac 
note in the exclamation that punctuates the seventh line and runs over into the eighth: “O 
könnt’ ich dir, liebliche Freundin, / Überliefern sogleich das lösende Wort!” (MA 6.1:14; 
O could I, my dearest companion, / Give you one happy word apt to resolve all at once!, 
77). The use of the subjunctive here indicates a crucial limitation in the project that the 
poet is undertaking, pointing to the impossibility of affording his beloved interlocutor an 
unmediated and complete understanding of nature’s “heiliges Rätsel” (holy secret) in the 
face of her perplexity before the profusion of plants and their foreign (Latin) names. This 
limit is not only linguistic—the lack of a verbal formula to resolve the mystery—but also 
epistemological and even, perhaps, ontological. Goethe, at Schiller’s urging, had 
absorbed enough Kant to recognize, as he put it in another of his maxims and reflections, 
that “Die Erscheinung ist nicht vom Beobachter losgelöst, vielmehr in die Individualität 
desselben verschlungen und verwickelt” (MA 17:928; the manifestation of a phenomenon 
is not detached from the observer—it is caught up and entangled in his individuality, 
Goethe, Scientific Studies, 307). This leads him to develop a hermeneutically inflected 
philosophy of science, encompassing a self-reflexive moment that he identified in the 
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preface to his Farbenlehre (Theory of Color, 1810) as “ironic” (Goethe, Scientific Studies, 
159; MA 10:11).
60
 In the poetic rendering of his observations on the metamorphosis of 
plants, however, this self-reflexive moment is, to use Schelling’s terms, raised to a new 
potency, through the disclosure of the situatedness of the speaker’s botany lesson in the 
amorous relationship with his interlocutor. Through his ecosemiotic use of poetic 
language, moreover, the speaker inducts his beloved into the kind of ““zarte Empirie” 
(MA 17:823; delicate empiricism) referred to in one of Goethe’s Maximen und 
Reflexionen, by engaging her empathetic interest in the inherently relational and 
communicative life of the growing plant, perceived as a subject with its own distinctive 
way of being and becoming. As Gernot Böhme observes in his landmark reading of the 
poem in the horizon of ecological aesthetics, Goethe’s elegy enacts a way of knowing 
nature that entails the recognition of human kinship with other-than-human beings.
61
 At 
the same time, though, the text deploys the heightened semiotic freedom that is specific 
to human language and integrally related to our capacity to grow in understanding of, and 
ethical responsiveness toward, our Earth others. 
As in his essay, so here too, Goethe’s poet-scientist explains that the unifying 
principle of all plant life can only be apprehended if the “Urpflanze,” or archetypal plant, 
is understood as a temporal process of becoming rather than as something that can be 
perceived directly in an individual plant at any one point in its metamorphosis. Following 
his elegiac acknowledgment of the inevitable inadequacy of his response to his 
interlocutor’s call, the speaker therefore proceeds to appeal to her imagination—and, 
implicitly, to that of the reader—in interpreting the “letters” of the divine creatrix (i.e., 
natura naturans) by observing the stages of plant growth and reproduction as rendered in 
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his verbal explanation. What is particularly striking about this poetic account of plant 
metamorphosis, when viewed from a biosemiotic perspective, is the way in which it 
gestures toward some of the sign relations that are specific to the life of plants. Among 
these are the discernment of moisture, which prompts the seed to germinate, sending its 
branching rootlets deeper into the earth, and of the light, toward which the growing 
seedling will gravitate, as well as the color of its foliage and fruit and the fragrance of its 
flowers, by means of which plants signal to potential pollinators and seed dispersers. 
Goethe could not have recognized the role of sap in those endosemiotic processes that 
facilitate plant growth and reproduction; nor could he have known of the importance of 
chemical signaling in the plant’s communication with sundry others, such as fungal 
symbionts in the soil, other plants, insect predators, and, if it is lucky, the other critters 
that some plants call upon to prey upon their predators.
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 In his choice of verbal 
constructions, Goethe nonetheless implies that these processes cannot be understood 
adequately within a narrowly mechanistic framework: that the plant has a degree of 
semiotic agency is suggested, for example, in its “sich vertrauend” (entrusting itself) to 
the moisture that it discerns, as well as in the “Reiz” (attraction) that it can be trusted to 
feel toward the light: 
 
 Werdend betrachte sie nun, wie nach und nach sich die Pflanze, 
    Stufenweise geführt, bildet zu Blüte und Frucht. 
 Aus dem Samen entwickelt sie sich, sobald ihn der Erde 
    Stille befruchtender Schoß hold in das Leben entläßt, 
 Und dem Reize des Lichts, des heiligen, ewig bewegten, 
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    Gleich den zärtesten Bau keimender Blätter empfiehlt. 
 Einfach schlief in dem Samen die Kraft; ein beginnendes Vorbild 
    Lag, verschlossen in sich, unter die Hülle gebeugt, 
 Blatt und Wurzel und Keim, nur halb geformet und farblos; 
    Trocken erhält so der Kern ruhiges Leben bewahrt, 
 Quillet strebend empor, sich milder Feuchte vertrauend, 
    Und erhebt sich sogleich aus der umgebenden Nacht. (ll. 9–20) 
 
[Watch as it comes into being, see how the plant through progression, 
Guided step-wise along, forms into flowers and fruit. 
It develops at once from the seed as soon as the quiet 
Life-giving womb of the earth bids it go free into life 
And to stimulant light, the sacred, for ever in motion, 
It trusts the delicate work of making the burgeoning leaves. 
Simple the force asleep in the seed; and incipient model 
Lay, enclosed in itself, curled up there under the sheath, 
Leaf and rootlet and bud, only half-formed with no colour; 
Thus the kernel sustains tranquil life in the dry, 
Straining upward it swells, on gentle moisture relying, 
Quickly lifting itself from the encompassing night.] 
 
The metamorphic trajectory that the poet-scientist traces in the plant is also said to 
figure in animal, as well as in human, life. At this point, the process of plant growth and 
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flowering, which culminates in the union of sexed parts in pollination, leading to the 
production of seed-bearing fruits, metamorphoses into a metaphor for the blossoming and 
generative relationship between the speaker and his interlocutor. This shift in turn invites 
a figurative rereading of the preceding narrative, which thereby acquires some decidedly 
erotic connotations. The “manchem Geschlecht” referred to in line 30, for example, at 
which the interlocutor is said to be “zum Erstaunen bewegt” (astounded) when it has 
completed its first phase of growth, literally denotes many a “kind” of plant. But the stem 
that is described in the following lines as “Viel gerippt und gezackt, auf mastig 
strotzender Fläche, / Scheinet die Fülle des Triebs frei und unendlich zu sein” (ll. 31–32; 
Much serrated and ribbed, on gorged and swelling surface, / Now the abundance of thrust 
seems to be endless and free) is also somewhat suggestive of the Geschlechtsteil of the 
speaker, which we might be tempted to imagine was similarly engorged, thrusting, and, 
perchance, astounding, under the influence of the attraction that first brought him 
together with his interlocutor. In this way, Goethe makes the most of those distinctively 
human semiotic freedoms that are associated with the multivalence of verbal, especially 
poetic, communication, even while he affirms, on both the literal and figurative level of 
the text, the continuity between human and other forms of life. By the same token, the 
reining in of the outward thrusting force that propels the plant into its next phase of 
development, and toward even greater perfection, finds an implied analogue in the ethical 
constraint that facilitates the metamorphosis of raw sexual appetite into respectful love 
for the other. As Boyle observes, in Goethe’s depiction of human becoming-with-others, 
the metamorphic agency of natura naturans does not end with sexual differentiation and 
reproduction but extends into the cultivation of Kant’s “kingdom of ends” (676). In the 
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case of the speaker and his interlocutor, moreover, the fruit of their maturing bond is a 
deepening of their shared regard for other living beings: “Die heilige Liebe / Strebt zu der 
höchsten Frucht gleicher Gesinnungen auf, / Gleicher Ansicht der Dinge, damit in 
harmonischem Anschaun / Sich verbinde das Paar, finde die höhere Welt” (ll. 77–80; 
“For love ever sacred aspires / To produce in like minds fruit of the highest degree, / In a 
likeness of view so in harmonious vision / Joined the pair may unite, rise to that high 
other world). Yet the shift to the conditional in the final couplet, echoing the use of the 
subjunctive in the earlier elegiac exclamation, hints at the uncertainty of this outcome: 
human consciousness might be a product of natural processes; but the creation of loving 
human interrelationships that are conducive to the flourishing of more-than-human life is 
necessarily also a cultural achievement (entailing, moreover, the acceptance that not all 
will share “a likeness of view”), and one that is by no means guaranteed: 
 
 Freue dich auch des heutigen Tags! Die heilige Liebe 
    Strebt zu der höchsten Frucht gleicher Gesinnungen auf, 
 Gleicher Ansicht der Dinge, damit in harmonischem Anschaun 
    Sich verbinde das Paar, finde die höhere Welt. (ll. 78–80) 
 
[Also rejoice in this day! For love ever sacred aspires 
To produce in like minds fruit of the highest degree, 
In a likeness of view so in harmonious vision 
Joined the pair may unite, rise to that high other world.] 
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Goethe departed from the “pansemiotic” proclivities of the younger Romantics, 
for whom, as Novalis put it, “everything speaks,” in his dawning recognition of some of 
the particular ways in which organic entities communicate.
64
 For Goethe, rocks, for 
instance, were “stumme Lehrer” (MA 17:849; silent teachers), while living things alone 
were truly “speaking.”65 Goethe nonetheless maintained that physics, and presumably 
also geology, no less than the life sciences, “mit allen liebenden, verehrenden, frommen 
Kräften in die Natur und das heilige Leben derselben einzudringen suchen” (MA 17:824; 
must use all its powers of love, respect, and reverence to find its way into nature and the 
sacred life of nature, Scientific Studies, 310). Later physicists would have done well to 
take this to heart, had they wished to avoid becoming “Death, the destroyer of worlds,” to 
recall Robert Oppenheimer, quoting the words of Shiva in the wake of the detonation of 
the first atomic bomb. In this spirit, Goethe observes in the preface to the Farbenlehre: 
“No one who is observant will ever find nature dead and silent.” In addition to its visual 
and aural communications, “So spricht die Natur hinabwärts zu andern Sinnen, zu 
bekannten, verkannten, unbekannten Sinnen, so spricht sie mit sich selbst und zu uns 
durch tausend Erscheinungen. Dem Aufmerksamen ist sie nirgends tot noch stumm” (MA 
10:9; [nature] speaks to other senses which lie even deeper, to known, misunderstood, 
and unknown senses. Thus it converses with itself and with us through a thousand 
phenomena, Scientific Studies, 158).The burgeoning field of biosemiotics is beginning to 
disclose some of these hitherto “unknown senses,” which turn out to include the chemical 
receptors and affectors by means of which plants grow, reproduce, and converse with 
other biota. In this way, biosemiotics invites us to leave our lonely self-imposed exile and 
rejoin the chorus of living beings from which Baconian man had departed in his bid for 
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godlike mastery, as the assemblage of imaginatively reanimated natural entities reduced 
to experimental objects complain in Novalis’s Lehrlinge zu Sais (Apprentices of Sais, 
1802).
68
 Ironically, however, the biosemiotic rediscovery that as living organisms we 
never ceased to be participants in a more-than-human choir is occurring at a time when 
many other-than-human voices are either being drowned out by the racket of our 
machines or extinguished forever as a consequence of the seemingly ecocidal 
socioeconomic trajectory that is fast going global. At this critical, perhaps even kairotic 
juncture, we therefore need to attend to the ecosemiotic witness of those artists and 
writers who are capable of engaging our empathetic responsiveness and ethical regard for 
more than only human others, as I believe Goethe succeeds in doing in “Die 
Metamorphose der Pflanzen” (and not only there). At the same time, those of us who are 
scholars in the humanities would do well to join in conversation with those natural 
scientists who have such wondrous things to tell us about the heteroglossic forms of 
communication through which Earth’s poesy finds material articulation. In so doing, we 
would be picking up the thread of those multifaceted conversations among poets, 
philosophers, historians, scientists, theologians, and (recalling the remarkable Humboldt 
brothers) linguists and geographers that were taking place in Germany around 1800, only 
to be rudely interrupted by the disciplinary divides of the modern constitution of 
knowledge: a rupture that continues to impede the kinds of multifaceted responses 
demanded by the pressing socioecological problems of our day. 
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